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Congestion Pricing
This paper presents a matching mechanism for assigning drivers to routes where the drivers pay a toll for the
marginal delay they impose on other drivers. The simple matching mechanism is derived from the RANKING
algorithm for online bipartite matching proposed by Karp et al. [8]. The toll, which is anticipatory in design, is
an adaption of one proposed by Dong et al. [5]. Our research proves that the matching mechanism proposed
here is pareto user-optimal and can be adapted to give network optimal results for the minimizing total social
cost of travel.
1 INTRODUCTION
To some, taxing vehicle operators for road access seems unfair because it is clearly a regressive tax.
However, it is highly logical because in addition to reducing road use, it could provide funds for
improving roads and extending both the reach and convenience of transit services which should
directly benefit less affluent travelers. A deeper look reveals that congestion pricing and related
market mechanisms pose very complex economic problems. That is, establishing where in the
networks to impose prices and what prices to pick to give road users incentives to limit their
non-essential trips while also making essential road use available for middle and low income users.
Many economists have tried to put realistic numbers on the cost of congestion in terms of time
lost in traffic and fuel wasted, but the true costs are much higher because of road injuries to drivers,
cyclists and pedestrians and the short-term and long term enormous environmental impacts.
Despite the emergence of new Mobility-as-a-System (MaaS) services[9] in the past decade, both
the number of private car owners and overall vehicle miles traveled (VMT) steadily increases every
year. In fact, in most urban areas MaaS has increased VMT without decreasing car ownership
because these services have drawn transit users out of those systems and increased the fraction of
single occupancy vehicles around airports. Without new road pricing solutions we can confidently
predict that road congestion will soon become the leading cause of air pollution and road accidents.
In this paper we propose the design of a market matching mechanism for as- signing drivers to
travel routes in which space on congested routes is allocated to drivers willing to pay a fee which
is equal to the cost of the delay imposed on other drivers. We show that our proposed matching
mechanism is stable, strategy-proof and efficient.
1.1 Literature Review
Our paper was inspired by the recent work of Heller et al. [7]. That very recent paper presents
a comprehensive literature review. Therefore, here we restrict ourselves to discussing the most
related papers. We differ from some other researchers in that rather than explicitly consider drivers’
individual value-of-time (VOT) we use willingness to pay tolls rather than selecting toll-free routes
as a proxy for VOT. In this approach we differ from Arnott et al. [1], van den Berg and Verhoef [11]
and many other researchers. Our work also draws on earlier work in Bernstein and El Sanhouri [3]
which considers congestion pricing with an untolled alternative.
1.2 Summary of Contributions
We start off with a model for the route assignment problem under traffic congestion conditions in
section 2, complete with a problem formulation and summary of the proposed algorithm. Where
[7] uses an auction mechanism, we propose the employment of a matching mechanism with an
anticipatory toll as an algorithmic solution in section 3. The simple matching mechanism proposed
here is derived from the RANKING algorithm for online bipartite matching proposed by Karp et al.
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2[8]. The toll, which is anticipatory in design, is an adaption of one proposed by Dong et al. [5].
We use a neural network model to predict short term future traffic flow conditions and charge a
toll that reflects those future conditions. The text goes on to prove that the matching mechanism
proposed here is pareto user-optimal as defined by [12], strategy-proof as defined by Nisan et al.
[10], and can be adapted to give network optimal results for minimizing total social cost of travel.
In section 4, we compare this matching with the auction mechanism when both are applied towards
traffic congestion pricing. A discussion follows in section 5.
2 MODEL
In this section, we present a problem definition, complete with theory of how the anticipatory toll
is obtained, and a summary of the matching mechanism employed. As a prelude, the notation used
is listed below.
Table 1. Table of Notation
𝑟 ≜ Route 𝑟
𝑑 ≜ Driver 𝑑
𝑞 ≜ Timestep
𝑘𝑓 ≜ Route threshold capacity for free flowing traffic
𝑘𝑡 ≜ Route capacity at a time 𝑡
𝐸𝑡 ≜ Estimated Travel time at a specific time t
𝐸𝑓 ≜ Estimated Travel time with free flowing traffic
𝐶𝑟 ≜ Toll on route r
𝐶𝑑 ≜ Toll paid by driver i
𝑋𝑡 ≜ Traffic concentration/flow at time t
𝐴,𝐵,𝐹 𝛽 ≜ Congestion constants
𝛼𝑑 ≜ Driver d’s willingness to pay toll(Equivalent to Value of Time)
𝑅(𝐸,𝐶)𝑟 ≜ Route r’s cost function
𝑈 (𝐸,𝐶)𝑑 ≜ Driver d’s utility function
𝑃 ≜ Penalty charge
2.1 Problem Formulation
Consider a metropolis where 𝑛 drivers want to travel from a common origin 𝑂 to a common
destination 𝐷 , with𝑚 routes available to the drivers. Note that a typical city will have many such
𝑂-𝐷 pairs, for example residential-work area pairs from which most travelers leave at common
times.
Define a route r to have;
• Threshold Capacity, 𝑘𝑓 , which is the route capacity that allows for free flowing traffic.
• A cost function, 𝑅(𝐸,𝐶)𝑟 = (𝐸𝑡 − 𝐸𝑓 )𝐶𝑟
Additionally, Define a driver d to have;
• A Willingness-to-pay measure (Value of time), 𝛼𝑑 , a maximum toll the driver is willing to
pay, with the assumption that all drivers prefer the fastest routes.
• A utility function,𝑈 (𝐸,𝐶)𝑑 = (𝐸𝑓 − 𝐸𝑡 )𝐶𝑑 , where;
– 𝐸𝑡 = 𝐸𝑓 [1 +𝐴( 𝑘𝑡𝑘𝑓 )𝐵] As presented by Chen et al. [4].
3– 𝐶𝑡𝑟 = 𝐶𝑡−1𝑟 + 𝛽 (𝑋𝑡+𝑞 − 𝑋𝑡 ) As presented by Dong et al. [5].
Ideally, we would like to dynamically match drivers to routes in some way such that every driver
𝑑’s utility is maximized and while also minimizing total congestion cost for all routes.
Here, we propose a simple online matching algorithm;
ALGORITHM 1: Online Driver-Route Matching
for Each driver that comes online do
(1) Rank all routes available to driver d by the projected utility 𝑈 (𝐸,𝐶)𝑑
(2) Assign top ranked route to driver 𝑑 with a deadline to accept the assignment
end
With a deadline to the assignment, drivers have an option to opt out of travel, however, if they
do travel and use or switch to a route different from the assigned route, they get penalized with
some charge; 𝑃 = 𝐶𝑡𝑟 + 𝐹 , where 𝐹 is a fixed rate. Analysis in later sections will show that this
simple matching mechanism is Pareto user-optimal and also minimizes the total congestion cost to
within at least 1 − 1𝑒 of the network optimal. We will also show that prove that the matching is
strategy-proof.
2.2 Anticipatory Toll
The cost of congestion on a route r is distributed among all travelling drivers in the form of an
anticipatory toll that is calculated from future traffic conditions. Below, we provide a definition.
𝐶𝑡𝑟 = 𝐶
𝑡−1
𝑟 + 𝛽 (𝑋𝑡+𝑞 − 𝑋𝑡 )
The driver is then charged as follows;
𝐶𝑡𝑑 =
{
𝐶𝑡𝑟
𝑘𝑡
; 𝑖 𝑓 𝑘𝑡 − 𝑘𝑓 > 0
0; 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
(1)
Dong et al. [5] compare the effectiveness of a static toll, reactive toll, and an anticipatory toll. Their
findings show that the anticipatory toll provides the best throughput.
2.2.1 Calculating Future traffic flow (𝑋𝑡+𝑞). We propose the use of convoluntion-long shortterm
models (CNN-LSTM) to predict short term traffic flow. Asadi and Regan [2] provide and compare a
few such model that takes an input a vector 𝑋 = 𝑋0, 𝑋1, ........, 𝑋𝑡 of traffic flow conditions up until
time 𝑡 , then provides as output a traffic flow prediction at time 𝑡 + 𝑞. We refer the reader to Asadi
and Regan [2] for more detail.
3 MATCHING MECHANISM
Traffic congestion is a socioeconomic problem therefore any solution for congestion pricing has to
be evaluated by how efficient it is from the perspective of road users and society as a whole. With
that in mind, this section provides a proof that the matching algorithm proposed by this text is
indeed pareto user-optimal and also achieves a fraction of the optimal total route network cost. We
begin with an illustrative example of the algorithm.
3.1 Illustrative Example
Given a collection of 𝑛 drivers in the order in which they came online, 𝐷 = (𝑑1, 𝑑2, ........, 𝑑𝑛−1, 𝑑𝑛)
and𝑚 available routes, 𝑅 = (𝑟1, 𝑟2, ........, 𝑟𝑚−1, 𝑟𝑚) For each driver 𝑑𝑖 ;
4(1) Rank all the routes such that,𝑈 (𝐸𝑟𝑖 ,𝐶𝑟𝑖 )𝑑𝑖 ≥ 𝑈 (𝐸𝑟𝑖+1 ,𝐶𝑟𝑖+1 )𝑑𝑖 , where𝑈 (𝐸𝑟𝑖 ,𝐶𝑟𝑖 )𝑑𝑖 is the utility
driver 𝑑𝑖 would get from taking route 𝑟𝑖 . Ties are broken by route capacities, 𝑘𝑡 .
(2) Assign the top ranked route with a deadline within which the driver must begin their travel.
While it is intuitively clear that this user-optimal, a short proof is provided below for complete-
ness.
3.2 Pareto Optimality
As a precursor to the proof, we provide a definition of Pareto Optimality.
Given 𝑛 users and 𝑛 resources, an allocation 𝑋 = (𝑥1, 𝑥2, ........, 𝑥𝑛−1, 𝑥𝑛) is pareto optimal if any
user 𝑖 can not obtain better utility in any other allocation 𝑋 ′ = (𝑥 ′1, 𝑥 ′2, ........, 𝑥 ′𝑛−1, 𝑥 ′𝑛). That is, for
each user 𝑖;
𝑈𝑖 (𝑥𝑖 ) ≥ 𝑈𝑖 (𝑥 ′𝑖 )
with at least one user 𝑗 for whom𝑈 𝑗 (𝑥 𝑗 ) > 𝑈 𝑗 (𝑥 ′𝑗 ).
3.2.1 Proof. Define the welfare of the matching 𝜇 produced by the algorithm for 𝑛 drivers to be
the sum of all utilities,
𝑊 (𝜇) =
𝑛∑
𝑖=1
𝑈𝑖 (𝜇)
Let us assume there was a better matching 𝜇 ′ where at least one driver 𝑑 has a different assignment
from that they get in 𝜇. This would imply that for 𝑑 ,𝑈𝑑 (𝜇 ′) > 𝑈𝑑 (𝜇) which would be a contradiction
to 𝜇 ′ being better because𝑊 (𝜇) >𝑊 (𝜇 ′)
We can conclude that 𝜇 dominates all other matchings 𝜇 ′ and is therefore Pareto user-optimal.
3.3 StrategyProofness
A matching mechanism is strategy-proof if truth telling is a utility maximizing strategy, that is, the
only way an agent can be guaranteed to get maximum utility is if they report true information.
For our matching, the driver is required to report the maximum toll they are willing to pay and
get online when they are ready to travel. Lets consider two cases for the proof.
3.3.1 Case 1: Driver gets online early to get better route. In this scenario, we have a driver 𝑑 log
on early so as to be higher in the driver queue. If a route is assigned and the driver does not start
traveling before the deadline, the assignment will be terminated, in which case the driver gets
𝑈𝑑 = 0. The only way they can get maximum possible utility is if they request a route when they
are ready to travel within the deadline.
3.3.2 Case 2: Driver under reports the maximum toll they are willing to pay . Lets also consider a
driver 𝑑 that reports their maximum toll to be 𝑙 but they are actually willing to pay a higher toll ℎ.
Driver 𝑑’s possible utility will be upper bounded by the possible utility with a toll of 𝑎, that is,
𝑈 (𝐸,𝐶)𝑑 = (𝐸𝑓 − 𝐸𝑡 )𝐶𝑑 ≤ (𝐸𝑓 − 𝐸𝑡 )𝑙 < (𝐸𝑓 − 𝐸𝑡 )ℎ
They would therefore get routes that do not maximize their utility. Further we make the assumption
that reporting a higher maximum would be individually irrational because the driver would be
assigned routes whose tolls they can not or will not pay. Therefore we do not explicitly include
this as a separate case.
3.4 Network Optimality: matching for social good
This paper assumes that maximizing users’ utility is a primary goal. However, the matching
mechanism proposed here can easily be adjusted to control the negative social costs of traffic
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If a user-optimal assignment is one in which every user gets the best possible assignment they can
get by any matching, a network optimal asks whether the total cost for all routes is minimized.
For the network optimality result, we will begin with a simple reduction of the traffic assignment
problem to online bipartite matching.
Consider a graph 𝐺 = (𝑈 ,𝑉 , 𝐸), where the vertices in 𝑈 are the drivers arriving online and the
vertices in 𝑉 are routes (Note that this is exactly online bipartite matching if we assume that there
enough spots for all drivers that want to travel).
ALGORITHM 2: Online Driver-Route Matching
for Each driver that comes online do
(1) Rank all routes available to driver d by cost 𝑅(𝐸,𝐶)𝑟
(2) Assign top ranked route to driver 𝑑 with a deadline to begin travel
end
Karp et al. [8] shows that this ranking matching mechanism achieves a competitive ratio of 1− 1𝑒 .
4 COMPARISON TO AUCTION MECHANISM
This section compares our matching mechanism to an auction mechanism proposed byHeller
et al. [7] for congestion pricing.Heller et al. [7] presents a two driver example to illustration their
mechanism, we will show how the matching mechanism proposed here performs on the same
scenario.
4.1 Auction mechanism
Under the auction mechanism (AUC), we have the same scenario of 𝑛 drivers traveling from Origin,
𝑂 to destination, 𝐷 . For simplicity, but without loss of generality, we will assume a single route
between 𝑂 and 𝐷 that may or may not be congested (as is assumed in Heller et al. [7], where the
auction mechanism for congestion pricing is introduced). Every driver 𝑑𝑖 has a value to traveling at
a certain time we call VOT (𝜃𝑖 ) where (𝜃𝑖 ) > 0. Every driver’s VOT is unknown to the mechanism
designer and drivers can travel(T) or opt out(O). Under the AUC, drivers can reduce travel time by
paying higher prices which would translate to less drivers travelling. Under this mechanism, drivers
place their bids according to their VOT and an allocation rule 𝐴(𝑥) determines which drivers get to
travel, with those drivers paying a price determined by a payment rule 𝑃 (𝑥).
Heller et al. [7] defines the utility of driver 𝑖 opting out to be
𝑢𝑜𝑖 = 0 (2)
and traveling with VOT 𝜃 , number of drivers 𝑘 , and paying 𝑝𝑖 , to be
𝑢𝑇𝑖 = 𝑣 (𝜃, 𝑘) − 𝑝𝑖 , (3)
where 𝑣 (𝜃, 𝑘) is the value gained from the trip. This value can be gotten from 𝑣 (𝜃, 𝑘) = 𝜃 (𝑆−𝑐 (𝑘)),
where 𝑆 is time without traffic and 𝑐 (𝑘) is the time with congestion.
4.2 The two driver example
Consider a scenario where we have two drivers that wish to travel with VOT (𝜃1, 𝜃2)
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would be as follows:
(𝑥)𝜃 =

1, 1; 𝑖 𝑓 𝜃1 ∈ [ 12𝜃2, 2𝜃2]
1, 0; 𝑖 𝑓 [𝜃1 > 2𝜃2]
0, 1; 𝑖 𝑓 [𝜃1 < 12𝜃2]
And payment rule:
𝑝1 (𝜃 ) =

0; 𝑖 𝑓 [𝜃1 < 12𝜃2]
𝜃2; 𝑖 𝑓 𝜃1 ∈ [ 12𝜃2, 2𝜃2]
3𝜃2; 𝑖 𝑓 [𝜃1 > 2𝜃2]
then respective travel time
times:
𝑡1 (𝜃 ) =

No travel; 𝑖 𝑓 [𝜃1 < 12𝜃2]
2; 𝑖 𝑓 𝜃1 ∈ [ 12𝜃2, 2𝜃2]
1; 𝑖 𝑓 [𝜃1 > 2𝜃2]
From above we have three cases:
(1) case 1: 𝜃1 ∈ [ 12𝜃2, 2𝜃2]
(a) Allocations
𝑀𝐴𝑈𝐶 = (1, 1)
𝑀𝑀𝐴𝑇 = (1, 1)
(b) Payments
𝑃𝐴𝑈𝐶1 = 𝜃2
𝑃𝑀𝐴𝑇1 = 𝐶𝑑 =
𝑖
𝑗
𝜃1 =
𝑖
𝑗
[ 12𝜃2, 2𝜃2]
(2) case 2: [𝜃1 > 2𝜃2]
(a) Allocations
𝑀𝐴𝑈𝐶 = (1, 0)
𝑀𝑀𝐴𝑇 = (1, 1)
(b) Payments
𝑃𝐴𝑈𝐶1 = 3𝜃2
𝑃𝑀𝐴𝑇1 =
𝑖
𝑗
𝜃1
(3) case 3: [𝜃1 < 12𝜃2]
(a) Allocations
𝑀𝐴𝑈𝐶 = (0, 1)
𝑀𝑀𝐴𝑇 = (1, 1)
(b) Payments
𝑃𝐴𝑈𝐶1 = 0
𝑃1 =
𝑖
𝑗
𝜃1
4.3 Utilities
Under some mild assumptions, we show here that the utilities achieved by the matching are superior
to those achieved by the auction mechanism.
4.3.1 Utility under Auction.
𝑈𝑑 = 𝜃𝑑 (𝑡𝑓 − 𝑘𝑐 ),
[7] assumes that,
𝑡𝑐 ≡ 𝑘𝑐 , 𝑡𝑓 = 4
therefore
𝑈𝑑 = 𝜃𝑑 (4 − 𝑡𝑐 )
4.3.2 Utility under Matching.
𝑈𝑑 = (𝑡𝑓 − 𝑡𝑐 )𝐶𝑑
but
𝐶𝑑 =
𝑖
𝑗
𝜃𝑑
with
𝑖 < 𝑗, 𝑡𝑓 = 4
then
𝐶𝑑 ≤ 𝜃𝑑
and therefore
𝑈𝑑 = (4 − 𝑡𝑐 ) 𝑖
𝑗
𝜃𝑑
From above, we can see that the possible utility obtained from the auction mechanism by a
driver, 𝑑 in the two driver example, is a fraction of the possible utility obtained under the matching
mechanism, i.e;
𝑈𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑑 =
𝑖
𝑗
𝑈𝐴𝑈𝐶𝑑
We can therefore conclude that the matching mechanism is preferable for each user since it achieves
a higher payoff for the drivers,
𝑈𝐴𝑈𝐶𝑑 ≤ 𝑈𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑑
75 DISCUSSION
5.1 Implications
As Infrastructure-as-a Service, Platform-as-a Service and Software-as-a-Service become the domi-
nant computing models for businesses large and small, Mobility-as-a-Service is emerging as an
important, and in the future, possible dominant model for transportation. While the potential
benefits of shared use autonomous vehicles are being examined from every available angle, the
negative impacts of early MaaS systems (ride-hailing services in particular) are wreaking havoc
in cities and at already congested sites including airports and rail terminals. Therefore, even in
the US where there has been extensive resistance to congestion based pricing, cities such as New
York, Los Angeles and San Francisco are considering following the leads of London, Singapore
and Stockholm in enacting congestion pricing and low emissions zone pricing to reduce peak
period congestion and pollution. Further, advances in tracking technology and emerging secure
and privacy preserving contracting systems make it possible to tax vehicles or drivers for the use
of limited infrastructure without putting their personal travel data at risk.
While estimates of the date at which society will see wide-scale adoption of autonomous vehicles
have been widely inaccurate, someday this will surely be the norm. Research into the impact of
autonomous vehicles on total vehicle-kilometer-traveled (VKT) have come up with highly variable
estimates Fagnant and Kockelman [6], but what is assumed is that without road pricing that
autonomous vehicles (many of the electric) would be free to impose externalities on the system
paying only for fuel use. Therefore a matching mechanism such as ours would allocate scare
resources more effectively.
5.2 Conclusion
This paper presents a matching mechanism for assigning drivers to routes where the drivers pay
a toll for the marginal delay they impose on other drivers. The simple matching mechanism is
derived from the RANKING algorithm for online bipartite matching proposed by Karp et al. [8].
The toll, which is anticipatory in design, is an adaption of one proposed by Dong et al. [5]. Our
research proves that the matching mechanism proposed here is pareto user-optimal and can be
adapted to give network optimal results for the minimizing total social cost of travel.
In the future, we intend to use a neural network model to predict short term future traffic flow
conditions such as the one proposed by Asadi and Regan [2] and charge a toll that reflects those
future conditions. Another goal is examine how efficient this matching mechanism is for solving
the dynamic traffic assignment problem.
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